Protecting the mission from outside capture
Whether a venture investor could take over CRIS's mission, and what would stop it.
Approved by the Board for implementation, 20 November 2026. Counsel is confirming the open points, shown in [brackets]. These bylaws work under Delaware law and our Certificate of Incorporation; where they differ, the law and the certificate prevail.
In one paragraph
Changing CRIS's mission would need the Board of Stewards, two-thirds of the votes, the Founder and Steward stock classes, and the Founder's consent. Investors would accept the mission in writing, hold only a minority of Board seats and get no veto over mission matters. If the Founder's share falls or someone builds a large stake, a proposed trust would elect a Board majority, once our certificate is amended.
The question this page answers
Could a venture investor take over CRIS's mission? Under the proposals, not without the agreement of several parties no investor can buy out. This page explains each protection and, just as important, the document that would make it bind.
Four locks on the mission
Section 3A.10 lists the mission-protected matters, such as changing the public benefit or selling control of core technology. None could happen without four separate approvals.
Section 3A.10. Mission-Protected Matters. None of the following may occur without (a) approval of the Board of Stewards after a Fourth Law Review, (b) the vote of holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding voting power, (c) the approval of the Class S stock and of the Class F stock voting as separate classes as the Certificate provides, and (d) the Founder's written consent while Section 3.5 applies:
- 1. any change to the specific public benefit, or ceasing to be a public benefit corporation;
- 2. a merger, conversion, sale of all or substantially all assets, or exclusive licence of core technologies that would transfer control of the mission;
- 3. issuing any stock or instrument that carries a right to elect a majority of Stewards, a veto over a matter in this Section, or more votes per share than Class F stock;
- 4. changing the number of Stewards or the method of electing them;
- 5. amending Articles II, III or III-A, or any provision of the Certificate in Annex A;
- 6. replacing the Continuity Function or reducing its rigour; and
- 7. withdrawing or weakening the People Stewardship Guarantees or the Africa and Global South Benefit Commitment, or amending Articles 3, 10.1, 10.2, 12 or 16 of the CRIS AI Constitution so as to weaken them.
- 1Board of Stewards approvalBylawsBinds once the bylaws are adopted
- 2Two-thirds of the votesBylaws, mirrored in the certificate (DGCL § 102(b)(4))Strongest once also in the certificate
- 3Class F and Class S votesCertificate (Annex A)Exists only once the certificate amendment is filed
- 4Founder consentCertificate, or a Founder Agreement under DGCL § 122(18)Exists only once filed or signed
Only the first lock binds through the bylaws alone. A bylaw cannot by itself restrict the Board's power to manage CRIS (DGCL §141(a)). So the other locks must live in the certificate or a signed agreement.
The article page shows the same gate as Figure F13.
The §241 window
Timing matters. Under DGCL §241, before any payment for stock has been received, the directors can amend the certificate without a stockholder vote. If no directors have been named or elected, the incorporator can.
The draft records that CRIS has received no payment for any stock, so the window is open. The plan is one Amended and Restated Certificate, filed before any share is issued. After that, each change would need stockholder votes, and class votes for any change that affects a class.
Five tests for outside financing
- 1 AcknowledgementThe investor accepts the public benefit, the Continuity Model and Article III-A in writing
- 2 Minority seatsInvestors as a group hold no more than a minority of the Stewards
- 3 No mission vetoNo veto or protective provision over a mission-protected matter
- 4 No forced saleNo drag-along, redemption or other right that could force a sale over the Steward or Founder stock
- 5 Fourth Law ReviewThe Board of Stewards approves, with a recorded review
Preferred first: revenue, grants, contributor and community capital, and revenue-based or non-voting instruments. The tests apply to any equity or convertible financing. The proposed Investor Mission Rider (Annex B) would carry them into each deal.
Section 3A.12. Standards for Outside Financing. The Corporation shall prefer capital that does not dilute stewardship: revenue, grants, contributor and community capital, and revenue-based or non-voting instruments. Any equity or convertible financing shall:
- 1. include the investor's written acknowledgement of the public benefit, the Continuity Model and this Article;
- 2. give investors, as a group, no more than a minority of the Stewards;
- 3. carry no veto or protective provision over a mission-protected matter;
- 4. carry no drag-along, redemption or other right that could force a sale or change of control over the objection of the Class S or Class F stock; and
- 5. be approved by the Board of Stewards with a recorded Fourth Law Review.
Capital we prefer
The first choice is capital that does not dilute stewardship: revenue, grants, contributor and community capital, and revenue-based or non-voting instruments. Equity comes last, and only if it passes all five tests.
Limits on large holdings
Section 3A.13. Transfer Restrictions. To the extent permitted by DGCL §202 and noted on the certificates or notices for the shares: (a) the Corporation and then the Founder have a right of first refusal on any proposed transfer of shares; and (b) no person, other than an Excluded Holder as defined in Annex A.3, may acquire shares that would give that person, with its affiliates, [twenty percent (20%)] or more of the voting power without the approval of the Board of Stewards and the Class S stock. A transfer in breach of this Section is void as against the Corporation.
The right of first refusal and the holding limit are transfer restrictions. Under DGCL §202, they bind a holder only if noted conspicuously on the share certificate or notice. Otherwise they bind only a holder who knew of them or agreed to them.
So the notice must go on every share from the first issue. The holding limit itself is a placeholder in the draft, still to be settled.
The limit, and the matching Trigger Event in Annex A, would not apply to an Excluded Holder: the Founder, holders of Class F stock as to their founder shares, and the parties to the Stewardship Voting Agreement acting under it. Without that carve-out, issuing the founder shares to the two founders could set off a Trigger Event against themselves.
The Continuity Stewardship Trust
The trust would be the long-term guardian of the mission. Annex B proposes a Delaware purpose trust that would hold the Class S stock and could not sell it.
Its trustees would be independent of investors and serve fixed terms. The Planetary Council would nominate them, and they would include members from Africa and the Global South.
The deed should also say how trustees are appointed and removed, what counts as a Trigger Event and who can change the trust's powers. The trust does not exist yet. It needs both the certificate amendment and a signed trust deed.
Proposed Certificate and agreement terms — not yet filed or signed
Annexes A and B are not part of the bylaws. They are shown here only as summaries, marked proposed, while the question of publishing them in full stays open.
Proposed in Annex A, not filed Summary — not a quote
- Class F (Founder) CommonThe Founder and the co-founderA separate class vote on mission-protected matters. Converts to Common if transferred outside permitted holders.[10] votes per share
- Class S (Steward) CommonThe Continuity Stewardship Trust onlyElects [one] Steward, rising to a majority on a Trigger Event. A separate class vote on mission-protected matters. No economic rights beyond par.[1] vote per share
- CommonEmployees, the ESOP trust, contributors and othersNo special rightsOne vote per share
- Preferred (undesignated)Investors, if any is issuedEconomic preferences only. Never a vote on mission-protected matters.As the Board fixes, never more than one per share
Trigger Events · the earliest of
- (a)The Founder ceases to hold a majority of the voting power
- (b)Any person or group, other than an Excluded Holder, acquires [20%] or more of the voting power
- (c)The Founder’s death or incapacity
- (d)[A fixed date, still to be chosen]
Annex B would add five agreements, each summarised in plain words:
- Stewardship Voting Agreement: the Founder and the co-founder would vote to uphold Articles II, III and III-A (DGCL §218).
- Continuity Stewardship Trust deed: the purpose trust described above.
- Investor Mission Rider: a side letter every investor signs, accepting the mission and waiving any claim that the Board must maximize profit.
- Stockholder agreement under DGCL §122(18): where counsel advises, consent rights granted directly to the Founder and the trust.
- Participant terms: the People Stewardship Guarantees written into the Participant Charter, terms and licences.
How it connects
- Article III-A — The Continuity Model and Mission Protection
- How Founder control works
- The Continuity Model
- The Global Councils and the Planetary Council
- Certificate of Incorporation
- Article XVI — Amendments
